00:42 <allmazz_> FDE is essential privacy measure, will safe your data in case of device loss, or essential attacks. btw, all androids and iphones have encrypted storages by default

00:46 <allmazz_> and actually, if you have FDE on laptop with some hardware protection(like security chips) it's almost impossible to deploy an evil maid attack by short time without critical zero day vulnerabilities or hardware backdoors/hacks. and even this will not enclose your data immediately

00:49 <allmazz> don't you think that it is necessary?

02:56 <spuostheterrible[mds]> <fl0_id> " but if you have such big..." <- Worse take, keys, one drive login cookies, saved passwords, etc

04:35 <talamander> hello, has anyone experienced extreme lag/freezing with the GUI/wm on M1 chips? It's started getting really bad in the last 1-2 weeks, started off gret for the first 1 month

04:45 <twb> One obvious benefit of FDE is that you don't have to nwipe or physically destroy the entire drive. You can just destroy the intermediary keys

04:45 <twb> i.e. it makes factory reset O(1) instead of O(n)

04:49 <talamander> nrelated to FDE, but curious if any recent kernel/mesa/power updates could cause window manager freezes?

04:50 <twb> No idea, sorry. I'm new here.

09:50 <fl0_id> spuostheterrible[mds] sure, if your thieve can either log in or extract stuff from the drive and doesn't just sell it for parts. with macbook etc it's even lesse relevant, b/c you cannot just boot off off usb and chroot or stuff like that. and I don't hink a random thief will solder off you storage chips to read them out

13:10 <Calandracas_> fl0_id, I even thought there was an additional layer of opal style encryption with the key fused into the processor or something like that

13:10 <Calandracas_> so even if a theif cared to solder off the the storage chips they stil would be unable to read anything

13:11 <bgtlover[mds]> Calandracas_: there's the TPM, if you're refering to that, but I dk if apple stuff has that

13:13 <chaos_princess> They have an equivalent. but if you leave it unencrypted, enable filevault and FMM under macos, otherwise, the thief can login to recoveryos without a password.

13:13 <chaos_princess> and, like, you can also use u-boot or grub to boot from a usb and grab data from there.

13:18 <Calandracas_> oh I must have been misinformed then, I thought that there was another transparent layer of encryption at the firmware level

13:18 <Calandracas_> something similar to OPAL

13:19 <chaos_princess> there is

13:19 <chaos_princess> it is just already unlocked at the point m1n1 starts

13:33 <chadmed> https://asahilinux.org/docs/platform/security/

13:36 <Calandracas_> Yeah that what I was refering to

17:53 <the_eye> oh wow. Have never seen this before.. Had set my macbook to sleep, opened it again and was presented with a screen showing the message "The screen locker is broken and unlocking is not possible any more", instead instructing me to switch to another virtual text console and run loginctl unlock-session 2.

17:54 <the_eye> which gets me to my question - the text on the virtual text consoles on this macbook is _extremely_ small. Is it a good idea for it to default to that?

19:32 <twb> That's probably kms picking the highest resolution by default, no?

19:44 <oxbar> Hi all.. trying to install grub and getting a Moreno.sh Dosen’t exist

19:45 <oxbar> Any ideas.. modinfo.sh

19:45 <oxbar> Installing void Linux

21:02 <oxbar> Error. "install: error: /usr/lib64/grub/x86_64-efi/modinfo.sh doesn't exist. Please specify --target or --directory"

21:22 <fl0_id> oxbar #asahi-alt

21:22 <fl0_id> probably